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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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Date of transcription 09/13/2006

On September 8, 2006, [redacted] DOB [redacted]  
[redacted], SSAN [redacted], was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of  
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), in Frederick, Maryland. After  
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the  
nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

[redacted] is familiar with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] was shown copies of photographs of two  
boxes and their contents located during an FBI search of  
USAMRIID in July 2004. The tops of both boxes, visible in the  
photographs shown to [redacted] are imprinted with the word

Investigation on 09/08/2006 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-4797Date dictated 09/13/2006by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/08/2006, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Both boxes also have the name [REDACTED] written on them and contained a number of glass vials containing dried *B. anthracis*.

[REDACTED] also reviewed photographs of the material contained in the vials but claims [REDACTED] has never before seen the vials. [REDACTED] was advised by interviewing agents that the material in the vials was reported to be soil samples taken from around the carcasses of animals that had died of anthrax, however, upon examination by the FBI Laboratory, no soil was found. When asked about [REDACTED] knowledge of a sampling method where soil from around an animal carcass is collected and sent to USAMRIID to isolate any *B. anthracis* that may be in that soil, [REDACTED] was "surprised". [REDACTED] explained that [REDACTED] did not think someone would send the soil samples from around an animal carcass without first isolating the organism, stating this "doesn't make sense." [REDACTED] believes that if [REDACTED] went to the trouble of collecting such a soil sample, [REDACTED] would then go ahead and isolate the *B. anthracis*, sending the isolated material rather than soil. [REDACTED] knows [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not know where the material in the vials would have been lyophilized because [REDACTED] was not familiar with the vials and could not determine from a photograph where the lyophilization would have been done. [REDACTED] suggested agents could examine the vials themselves to determine where they were made and go from there.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not think it would be unusual for a lab such as the one at [REDACTED] to have a lyophilizer and that

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/08/2006, Page 3

lyophilization is not an unusual way to keep stocks of material. While *B. anthracis* spores are traditionally kept in a refrigerator or freezer, many pathogens are regularly lyophilized for storage, such as *E. coli*, and it is not uncommon for *B. anthracis* to be lyophilized as well. [REDACTED] commented it is much easier to store lyophilized material because it can be stored in a smaller space and you do not have to be concerned with maintaining a refrigerator or freezer. According to [REDACTED] lyophilizers at USAMRIID are maintained on the "cold side" so they cannot be used for virulent strains.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] had a list at one time of the isolates in the collection. [REDACTED] also suggested talking to [REDACTED] as well as [REDACTED] and BRUCE IVINS who study vaccine strains from around the world.

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] does not recall which strain was used in [REDACTED] work but

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/08/2006, Page 4

stated "we've always worked with the Ames strain," although [REDACTED] does not know "if it was the infamous strain" (writer's comment: [REDACTED] is likely referring to a specific stock of Ames that has been identified by the FBI as the likely source of the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks).

[REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] *B. anthracis* has some of the same enterotoxin genes as *B. cereus* - *B. anthracis* makes some of the genes that *B. cereus* makes, but not at the same level. [REDACTED] does not think [REDACTED] worked on other pathogens and noted that the work was published. [REDACTED] added that the work was done using a mutant of the Ames strain that was not virulent, although some work was done on the fully virulent strain.

[REDACTED] would have gotten any required Ames for [REDACTED] research from the lab, and [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] probably went through [REDACTED] admits, however anybody could have provided [REDACTED] with the material [REDACTED] needed. [REDACTED] commented that [REDACTED] then would have made [REDACTED] own stock of Ames.

[REDACTED] was shown copies of a request to the U.S. Department of Commerce, made by IVINS, to provide the Ames strain to the [REDACTED] scientists; [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] When asked if the Ames was provided to [REDACTED] anyway, [REDACTED] stated "We don't do those things. [REDACTED] but of course its possible [REDACTED] took it."

According to [REDACTED] continued without Ames, [REDACTED] believes it would have been preferable to use Ames because it was the first strain sequenced, but it was not a big deal to use a different strain. According to [REDACTED] from an infectious disease perspective, the differences in strains are not significant and there should be no surprises in such work done with Ames or Vollum.

All foreign visitors to USAMRIID are escorted by authorized personnel, and [REDACTED] believes it would be "very rare" for a foreign visitor to be unescorted.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/08/2006, Page 5

With regard to the use of fermenters at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] has used the Sterne strain in fermenters but does not think virulent *B. anthracis* was ever grown in the fermenters. [REDACTED] advised that there should be records of any such use in the laboratory notebooks but stated it was not common practice to use a fermenter, so it would be noticed by others if fermenters were running.

[REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] using fermentation to grow an attenuated strain of *B. anthracis* for their vaccine research, but to [REDACTED] knowledge they did not use fully virulent *B. anthracis*.

[REDACTED] does not have any relatives in the New Jersey area. [REDACTED]

Interviewing agents asked [REDACTED] they should contact [REDACTED] about dry powders. There have been discussions "relatively recently" among anthrax researchers at USAMRIID about the need to work with dry powder. [REDACTED] thinks these discussions had taken place within the last five to ten years. The discussions are due to the fact that USAMRIID researchers work with liquid, or wet spores, but that is not what they expect to find in an offensive use situation. There are proponents for both sides (liquids versus powders). [REDACTED] stated that the discussions were verbal and not the topic of e-mails or written discussions.

When asked by interviewing agents if USAMRIID had a central stock of media components for fermentation, [REDACTED] responded that heavy metals were pretty much common between different media, but unusual items, such as egg yolk, would be individual.

Copies of all items reviewed by [REDACTED] are included with the notes of this interview in a 1A envelope, along with the copy of [REDACTED]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 08/24/2006

[redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, on the  
afternoon of August 23, 2006, at [redacted] place of employment [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing Postal Inspector and Special Agent  
(SA) and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this  
document is a non-disclosure agreement form [redacted] voluntarily  
signed.)

[redacted] graduated with a [redacted] degree in [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] the United States Army Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,  
Maryland.

[redacted] advised [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] Division  
from [redacted] through [redacted] where [redacted] was a [redacted]  
[redacted]

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this  
communication are USAMRIID floor plans [redacted] was provided for  
review.)

[redacted] advised [redacted] laboratory was located in the room  
identified as [redacted] in USAMRIID building [redacted] on the provided  
[redacted]

Investigation on 08/23/2006 a [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-1799

Date dictated N/A

Postal Inspector [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2006, Page 2

USAMRIID floor plans. [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] research did not pertain to *Bacillus anthracis*: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never worked with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* or any of its components. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] laboratory was "cold," and contained no Select Agents. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was in the B3 and B4 hot suites on a handful of occasions.

[REDACTED] acknowledged "piggybacking" occurred at USAMRIID; however, [REDACTED] never observed anyone "piggybacking" into, or out of, a hot suite at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised "piggybacking" was not the only mechanism one could covertly enter a hot suite: one could use another's badge and personal identification number (PIN) after hours when the hot suite was empty.

[REDACTED] indicated the civilian scientists who routinely worked in the B3 and B4 hot suite were very particular as to allow only those with a need to enter the hot suite. [REDACTED] indicated there was a steep learning curve whereby the new person conducted absolutely no bench work and simply observed. Only after a period of time did the civilian scientist allow the new person to conduct relatively simple tasks at first. [REDACTED] further advised that new persons [REDACTED] were always escorted even though [REDACTED] had the proper immunizations, badge, and PIN to enter the B3 or B4 hot suite on [REDACTED] own.

[REDACTED] advised to the best of [REDACTED] recollection the code [REDACTED] entered at the B3 or B4 keypad was [REDACTED] own unique PIN. [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] was unaware of a generic code that would allow anyone access to the B3 or B4 hot suite.

[REDACTED] recalled the specific instances [REDACTED] was in the B3 or B4 hot suite. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further recalled [REDACTED] entered the B3 and B4 suites on other occasions for [REDACTED] advised aside from the big fermentor located in the B4 hot suite, [REDACTED] could not recall if [REDACTED] ever observed any other bench-top sized fermentors. [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2006, Page 3

[REDACTED] advised the only lyophilizer [REDACTED] recalled was located outside the B3/B4 hot suites in the hallway between the B4 and B5 suites. [REDACTED] advised this lyophilizer was not a large port-style lyophilizer, rather a smaller bench-top version.

[REDACTED] advised to [REDACTED] knowledge [REDACTED] never recalled observing any equipment that may be used in the production of "weaponized" *Bacillus anthracis* such as: small fermentors, drum dryers, freezers, or spray dryers. [REDACTED] acknowledged the possibility existed there were other mechanisms located within the B3/B4 hot suites one may use to dry a liquid spore sample of *Bacillus anthracis* that [REDACTED] was unaware of.

[REDACTED] recalled within the hallways of the B3 and B4 hot suites were freezers that contained the bacterial Select Agents; however [REDACTED] had no knowledge of which freezers contained *Bacillus anthracis*. [REDACTED] advised to the best of [REDACTED] knowledge these freezers were locked with combination padlocks like those that one would find on a gym locker.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never removed *Bacillus anthracis* nor any other Select Agent from the B3 or B4 hot suite; furthermore, no one ever asked [REDACTED] to do so.

[REDACTED] recalled the following information pertaining to [REDACTED] fellow [REDACTED] Division co-workers:

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

BRUCE IVINS, a civilian scientist, whose office was located in USAMRIID building 1425, room 019, on the provided USAMRIID floor plans. IVINS was a jovial guy with a good sense of humor. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised after the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, IVINS's personality differed as he was not the same jovial guy [REDACTED] previously had known. [REDACTED] opined the investigation into the anthrax-laced letter mailings being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation had taken an emotional toll on IVINS. IVINS had indicated [REDACTED] that he was certain the Federal Bureau of Investigation was listening to IVINS's telephonic conversations at home and at work. [REDACTED] opined the civilian scientists at USAMRIID were patriotic, and the fact that the investigation being conducted

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/23/2006, Page 4

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation continued to focus on  
USAMRIID was deemed unfair.

[redacted]  
[redacted] advised although [redacted] had a disagreeable  
personality, it was [redacted] opinion that [redacted] had nothing to do  
with the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. There was another  
individual [redacted]

[redacted] that had disagreements with  
[redacted] however, [redacted] could not recall [redacted] name.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/23/2006, Page 5

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] never observed anyone from the [redacted] Division in the B3 or B4 hot suite; however, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] recalled two other instances [redacted] spoke to [redacted] Once [redacted] recalled interacting with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 08/23/2006, Page 6

[redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] had no knowledge of [redacted] and [redacted] interacting at USAMRIID or socially.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised while at USAMRIID, visitors from [redacted] visited USAMRIID; however, to [redacted] knowledge they did not have access to the hot suites. [redacted] further advised [redacted] would be more knowledgeable of their visit. [redacted] indicated [redacted] was agreeable to re-contact by writer to discuss further observations [redacted] may have had while at [redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2006, Page 7

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this document is an exemplar of pre-stamped envelope similar to those utilized in the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 which [REDACTED] was provided for review.)

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] never recalled seeing pre-stamped envelopes around in the [REDACTED] Division.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey in September 2001, nor in October 2001. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] worked in Frederick County, Maryland, in 2001.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was not involved in, or otherwise had any additional knowledge pertinent to the investigation of, the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

[REDACTED] agreed to contact the interviewing Postal Inspector or SA should [REDACTED] recall any additional information.

Through observation and interview [REDACTED] is further described as:

LAST NAME:  
FIRST NAME:  
MIDDLE NAME:  
ALIAS (ES):  
SEX:  
RACE:  
SSAN:  
DOB:  
TITLE:

EMPLOYER:

WORK TELEPHONE:  
HOME:

[REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 11/30/2006

[redacted] born [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence, [redacted] a. and [redacted] telephone numbers are [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted] regular e-mail account for the past [redacted] years has been [redacted]

[redacted] does not know nor recall any correspondence with an individual known as Bruce Ivins or the AOL account name "Kingbadger7."

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] Kappa Kappa Gamma sorority

[redacted]  
[redacted] currently works in [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] work e-mail is [redacted]

Investigation on 11/30/2006 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-LEAD 302 #4813 Date dictated 11/30/2006

by SA [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 11/28/2006

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On November 21, 2006, [redacted] DOB [redacted]  
[redacted] SSAN [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment, [redacted] After being  
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature  
of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] kept [redacted] old emails on computer disks, and agreed  
to search [redacted] records for email to or from  
skymasterson17@hotmail.com, jimmyflathead@yahoo.com, and  
kingbadger7@aol.com as well as the names BRUCE IVINS and [redacted]  
[redacted] contacted interviewing agent on November 27,  
2006 to advise [redacted] was unable to find any emails that used either  
of these email addresses or referenced IVINS or [redacted]

Investigation on 11/21/2006 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4814

Date dictated 11/24/2006

by SA [redacted]

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These printouts from  email as well as  business card and a Non-Disclosure Agreement signed by  are enclosed with the original notes of this interview.

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 11/17/2006

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was  
offended by inappropriate comments IVINS had made [REDACTED]

IVINS has an observable disdain for [REDACTED]  
and IVINS, in the past, [REDACTED]

Investigation on 11/17/2006 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302

Date dictated N/A

by Special Agent [REDACTED]  
Postal Inspector [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Individual, On 11/17/2006, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IVINS has remarked he continues to work at USAMRIID because he is otherwise financially responsible for providing for [REDACTED] health insurance.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 12/22/2006

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence located at [redacted] by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office and Postal Inspector (PI) [redacted] Washington Division. [redacted] was previously interviewed by the FBI on approximately six separate occasions regarding [redacted] work with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) [Anthrax] while being employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement which was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile. [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

During the windows of opportunity for the Anthrax mailings in September and October of 2001, [redacted] was not able to provide any additional time-line information other than what [redacted] already provided the FBI. [redacted] explained that [redacted] previously attempted to determine if USAMRIID could obtain old emails which could benefit investigators for [redacted] time-line [redacted] was not able to obtain the old emails. In 2001 [redacted] had the same home phone number as [redacted] did at the time of this interview, [redacted] did not have a cellular phone; but had a home email address of [redacted]. The vehicles [redacted] owned were a [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] home email address is [redacted]  
[redacted] does not maintain any other email addresses.

Investigation on 12/21/2006 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302 <sup>4830</sup> 279A-WF-222936- <sup>20</sup> [redacted] Date dictated 12/22/2006by SA [redacted]  
PI [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/21/2006, Page 2

[redacted]

[redacted] began employment at USAMRIID in [redacted]  
[redacted] of [redacted] currently works with Ba [redacted]  
At the time of the Anthrax mailings in September of 2001, [redacted]  
worked with [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] performed research on  
Ba. [redacted] could not elaborate on a specific type of Ba used in  
[redacted] research [redacted] just referred to it as Ames. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] described [redacted] as  
a "very careful" researcher.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] continues to conduct research  
using Ames. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 12/21/2006, Page 3

\_\_\_\_\_ did not have any friends or family that reside in New Jersey. \_\_\_\_\_ does not remain in contact with anyone in New Jersey. At the time of the Anthrax mailings \_\_\_\_\_ had not traveled to or through New Jersey. In 1998, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_. Regarding IVINS, \_\_\_\_\_ stated "I like him"

\_\_\_\_\_ considered IVINS an expert with Ba. IVINS liked practical jokes and liked to gossip. IVINS did not attend the party with \_\_\_\_\_

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IVINS was also Catholic but  commented that IVINS was more of a moderate or mainstream Catholic now. In the past, IVINS was known to be a more strict Catholic.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/21/2006, Page 5

[redacted] drew a rough organizational chart of the 2006 chain of command for the [redacted] Division [redacted]

[redacted]

In addition to the current organizational chart, [redacted] provided the 2001 chain of command for the [redacted] Division [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The organizational chart drawn by [redacted] was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile.

[redacted]

[redacted] went into the hot suites of building [redacted] for the first time in [redacted]. By [redacted] was able to go into the hot suites by [redacted]. New persons at the lab were discouraged from being in the hot suites by themselves. Once a person had a reasonable amount of experience they were allowed to enter the suites alone. The reason for the rule was for the safety of USAMRIID employees. [redacted] would occasionally go into USAMRIID on weekends to quickly check an experiment.

Just before and during the Anthrax mailings in 2001, [redacted] was not aware of any researcher that [redacted] worked with in the hot suites of building [redacted] that conducted research on a project that required them to work extended hours, late nights or weekends. [redacted] advised that a researcher may have to go into

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/21/2006, Page 6

the lab on the weekends or at night to check up on an experiment, but would not spend much time in the hot suites.

[redacted] provided the names of [redacted] co-workers in 2001 at the time of the mailings. [redacted]

[redacted] thought that all [redacted] were good people and could not imagine that any of them could be involved in the Anthrax mailings. [redacted] commented that if [redacted] knew who was involved in the Anthrax mailings they would have gone to authorities to receive the 2.5 million dollar reward.

[redacted] of building [redacted] was closed for decontamination and remodeling prior to September 2001. During the time that [redacted] was shut down, [redacted]

[redacted] In September 2001, [redacted] everything was put on hold. [redacted] later learned that [redacted] was not truly ready to be utilized [redacted]. The Anthrax letters processed at USAMRIID were processed in [redacted]

[redacted] did not know any [redacted] that had an increased alcohol consumption from 2001 to present.

[redacted] was not aware of drinking problems, marital problems, mental problems or strange sexual behavior of any of

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 12/21/2006 , Page 7

[redacted] except for IVINS. Because of USAMRIID's Personal Reliability Program (PRP), IVINS was identified as having a type of medical problem. [redacted] did not know the specifics but IVINS was not allowed in the hot suites for approximately one month in 2006, due to some type of problem with taking depression medication. [redacted] did not know how IVINS' problem was finally resolved that allowed IVINS access back into the hot suites. The PRP program was not in effect in 2001. [redacted] was not aware of any pornography stored on work computers. [redacted] did not observe pornography on any computers utilized by [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] wanted the FBI investigation to just be done and over with. [redacted] feel that they are being punished [redacted] could not imagine that anyone [redacted] would protect someone who performed the Anthrax mailings. Following interviews with the FBI, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] feels the FBI is concentrating their investigation upon co-worker IVINS, [redacted]

[redacted] heard from [redacted] that the polygraph process was very unpleasant. [redacted] heard that during the polygraph questions of a personal nature were asked like "have you ever stolen anything" and "have you ever lied to anyone." [redacted] added that the polygraph examinations tended to get [redacted] "ramped up." In addition, they felt like they were being picked on during the polygraph questioning. The results of the polygraphs were never discussed.

[redacted] did not know anyone that was obsessed with the FBI investigation into the Anthrax mailings. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/21/2006, Page 8

[redacted]

[redacted] did not remember anyone working late night or weekend hours during the time period of the Anthrax mailings. [redacted] did not know [redacted] that have right or left wing political views. [redacted] did not know [redacted] that had strange hobbies. [redacted] do send joke emails to each other and some do contain images, but the images are not pornography and [redacted] did not consider the joke emails excessive. [redacted] did not know of anyone who had financial stress in 2001 or in the present.

[redacted] has never sent or attempted to send Ba to anyone. [redacted] recalled that in the summer of 2001, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has never worked with dried Ba and did not know anybody at USAMRIID or other research facilities that work with dried Ba. [redacted] thought that researchers who worked at Dugway Proving Ground may work with dried Ba. [redacted] stated that not many people who work at USAMRIID leave for private industry or other jobs opportunities. In addition [redacted] did not know of anyone from Dugway that now works for USAMRIID. [redacted] did not know how to duplicate the dried Ba that [redacted] observed in one of the Anthrax letters that was processed at USAMRIID. [redacted] commented that once Ba was dried, [redacted] guessed it would be in a crystal type form and did not know how to get the Ba in such a fine form like in the letters. [redacted]

[redacted] In addition [redacted] was scared for [redacted] family and thought that a wave of attacks may occur using different delivery methods.

The only time [redacted] heard anyone discuss working with dried Ba was during a conference at [redacted] in [redacted] in approximately 2004. [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302, 279A-WF-222936-[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/21/2006, Page 9

[redacted]

[redacted] also recalled a Ba simulant test conducted by NBAC for the FBI. Due to the poor control of the experiment, Ba simulant contaminated areas of USAMRIID including the hallway by hot suites near the AR area in building 1425. USAMRIID researchers thought the contamination was unprofessional.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] did not recognize a two page memo shown to [redacted] dated February 17, 1999, subject "Inappropriate behavior of subordinates", which was attached to an email. The memo was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile.

[redacted] recalled that [redacted] had received RMR 1029 from IVINS when [redacted] first started research at USAMRIID. [redacted] could only recall one occasion that this occurred. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/21/2006, Page 10



[redacted] was not concerned with what type of *Ba* was utilized in [redacted] research, such as the RMR 1029, only that it was Ames *Ba*. [redacted] placed a copy of the specifications for RMR 1029 in [redacted] lab notebook, [redacted]. [redacted] said that the Ames strain of *Ba* would not be typically referenced back to a specific researchers stock. [redacted] added that there was really no difference between one researcher's stock versus another.

IVINS provided an aliquot of RMR 1029 to [redacted] in a 15 milliliter (ml) conical. [redacted]



[redacted] when USAMRIID was initially ordered to provide the FBI with samples for the FBI Repository. [redacted] did not receive any formal documentation (written or email) on the procedure for providing the samples. [redacted] said the procedure for providing samples to the FBI was simple. When [redacted] provided frozen samples to the FBI Repository, [redacted] would poke through the frozen top and skim off the top for a sample. [redacted] provided the FBI repository with approximately 30-40 samples, ½ a box full, which was everything [redacted] had.

When [redacted] grew spores [redacted] used the protocol that IVINS [redacted] developed. [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/21/2006, Page 11

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

When people determine where [REDACTED] works and then ask [REDACTED] questions about the Anthrax attacks, [REDACTED] feels embarrassed that [REDACTED] is associated with the attacks because of where [REDACTED] is employed. [REDACTED] only really thinks about the attacks when the FBI calls. For [REDACTED] the attacks and resultant murders are outside their realm of reality.

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] who have any type of connections to New Jersey. [REDACTED] knew the Universities where [REDACTED] received their graduate education.

[REDACTED] knew what a lyophilizer was and assumed that if someone was the head of the BACTERIOLOGY department, they would know what a lyophilizer was also..

[REDACTED] did not know anybody that could have an ax to grind with [REDACTED] did not work with [REDACTED] on any particular projects, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302, 279A-WF-222936-

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 12/21/2006, Page 12

\_\_\_\_\_ would not be happy  
about \_\_\_\_\_ if \_\_\_\_\_ agreed to assist the FBI.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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Date of transcription 01/09/2007

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] IVINS are all very senior and respected scientists at USAMRIID. [Redacted] been opinionated pertaining to the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at USAMRIID and its investigation into the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. Individual opined it was the perception of these senior scientists that the FBI was treating them as suspects in the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. (1-2)

[Redacted]

01/09/2007 Frederick, Maryland

Investigation on

279A-WF-222936-302, [Redacted]

N/A

File #

Special Agent [Redacted]

Date dictated

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b7D

by

Postal Inspector [Redacted]

b7D

279A-WF-222936-302, [REDACTED]

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b7C  
b7DContinuation of FD-302 of Individual, On 11/03/2006, Page 2

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] IVINS allegedly queried  
[REDACTED] pertaining whether or not [REDACTED] knew if the FBI took anything  
from the hot suite and similar questions.

Individual reiterated it was well known to most  
[REDACTED] Division employees that IVINS has a fascination with  
sororities. Years ago IVINS took a interest in a fellow  
Bacteriology Division co-worker's niece, and queried the co-worker  
as to whether or not the niece participated in a sorority specific  
event. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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11/17/2006

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

There is information circulating on a limited basis at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) that the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) was in the hot suites on Friday November 10, 2006. It is known that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Case ID : [REDACTED]  
279A-WF-222936-302  
320A-WF-C230051

Serial : 4  
4835  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/22/2007

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]


①

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Investigation on 01/22/2007 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302Date dictated N/Ab6  
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b7DSpecial Agent [Redacted]  
by Postal Inspector [Redacted]



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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/23/2007

On January 19, 2007, [redacted] date of birth  
November 24, 1974, was interviewed at [redacted] place of residence, [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] After being  
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of  
the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

[redacted] is currently employed in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that approximately ninety percent of [redacted]  
work at USAMRIID was with Bacillus anthracis (Ba), and ten percent  
was with [redacted]  
[redacted] team lead by [redacted] during the first [redacted] of  
[redacted] assignment at USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 01/19/2007 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4840Date dictated 01/23/2007

by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/19/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not do any work involving the drying of Ba, and did not use a lyophilizer. [REDACTED] was not aware of any samples of dried Ba.

[REDACTED] was unsure if the strain(s) were fully characterized. [REDACTED] recalled that they received shipments of Ba from [REDACTED] and other locations. [REDACTED] did not specifically recall receiving the Ames strain, and stated that the protocols used for each strain were dependent on where the strain came from.

No one in the lab worked on weaponization techniques. The two doctors, [REDACTED] and Dr. Ivins, were responsible for spore production, and the technicians, [REDACTED] did not perform that function.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] identified areas in both Building [REDACTED] and Building [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] worked. The areas are marked on the building diagrams, which have been placed in an FD-340. In Building [REDACTED] worked in the [REDACTED] section in the [REDACTED] of the building. The areas containing the offices and hot suites are both marked on the diagram for Building [REDACTED]. In Building [REDACTED] worked on the [REDACTED] floor in the [REDACTED] section. This area is marked on the diagram for Building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did use the hot are of Building [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] floor, and did use the walk-in cooler. Room [REDACTED] Ba was stored there, and all the members of the [REDACTED] section had access to the cooler and the suites. In addition to the members listed above in this communication, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had access. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not know of any instances where "piggy-backing" took place, and believed that it would be very difficult to piggy-back into and out of a building or hot suite. Badges were

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/19/2007, Page 3

required at each exterior building door, except for the main entrance to Building \_\_\_\_\_, which was guarded. Once an employee was inside an exterior building door, there was still a security guard or camera present to confirm who entered and left the building. Badges were also required to enter lab areas and suites. However, once inside a lab area or suite, doors were not locked and badges were not necessary. This included cold storage areas, which were not locked. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ never saw any visitors in \_\_\_\_\_ office area or suites. There were occasions when employees would forget or lose their badges, in which case they were issued a temporary badge. The temporary badges were issued after security checked the employee's identification, and the temporary badge was only good for one day and would only afford the same level access that the employee had with their normally issued badge. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that any visitors would need a temporary badge and would need to be escorted.

\_\_\_\_\_ could not think of any reasonable scenario where someone could remove Select Agents from the hot areas covertly, and was not aware of any individuals who had tried to do so. \_\_\_\_\_ explained that in order to enter a hot suite, an employee had to remove all their clothing and don scrubs. When leaving the hot suite, the employee would remove the scrubs and don their street clothes. Even though there were no security guards or cameras present during this ingress and egress, \_\_\_\_\_ believed it would be unlikely that someone would hand-carry an item such as a Select Agent out of a hot suite. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that the lab did not operate continuously and that \_\_\_\_\_ schedule was Monday-Friday during the day. However, some people did come in on the weekends or after hours if they were behind in their work.

\_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of any individuals that said they might take a Select Agent, nor was \_\_\_\_\_ aware of any individuals with access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others. \_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of any individuals who were associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters. Many people in the lab had access to Select Agents, but none had displayed any disposition to do harm. In addition to those already named, \_\_\_\_\_ listed the following as having access to Select Agents:

\_\_\_\_\_

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/19/2007, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents, other than for legitimate employment reasons.

\_\_\_\_\_ had "no clue" how to dry Ba and send it through the mail. \_\_\_\_\_ reiterated that \_\_\_\_\_ had never handled the dried organism, and had always worked with Ba while it was suspended in a flask or in a plate. \_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of any individual who expressed an interest in being able to circumvent forensic techniques.

\_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ transferred from USAMRIID to Fort Dix, New Jersey shortly after \_\_\_\_\_ arrival at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ believed this was a routine transfer. \_\_\_\_\_ had no personal or professional association with any areas of New Jersey, nor did \_\_\_\_\_ know of any other individuals who had personal or professional associations with New Jersey. \_\_\_\_\_ did not travel to New Jersey during September or October 2001, and is not aware of anyone who did travel to New Jersey during that time period. \_\_\_\_\_ was living in \_\_\_\_\_ during that time period.

\_\_\_\_\_ was aware of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for decontamination of Class II and III biosafety cabinets, but could not recall any specific steps. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled the SOPs as being multi-step processes, but never had to use them. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled that lab personnel were not allowed to leave the hot suite in the event decontamination was needed, until cleared by HAZMAT personnel. \_\_\_\_\_ believed that \_\_\_\_\_ might have participated in a drill to exercise the use of the SOPs.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not work in the virology areas, and never used paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation. \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall ever smelling bacterial decontamination agents.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not use plastic storage containers for storage of materials at USAMRIID, nor did \_\_\_\_\_ notice their use by anyone else in the lab.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not recall ever working with simulants. All of \_\_\_\_\_ work was recorded in lab notebooks. These notebooks were stored in the Bacteriological section's office, on a shelf above the microbiologist's desk. \_\_\_\_\_ was unsure of how long these notebooks were retained.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/19/2007, Page 5

[REDACTED] never purchased pre-stamped envelopes, and never used any vending machines in Frederick, Maryland to purchase pre-stamped envelopes. [REDACTED] did not personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not conduct any analytical work on the evidence in the captioned case.

[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone named [REDACTED] and did not recall anyone by that name at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone named [REDACTED] was not aware of anything related to the anthrax letter mailings.

[REDACTED] never escorted any visitors, either foreign or U.S. citizens, nor did [REDACTED] recall any visitors in [REDACTED] lab area or suites.

[REDACTED] was not a member of [REDACTED] and when asked, [REDACTED] could not describe the function of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did work in the [REDACTED] labs in Building [REDACTED] but was not aware of any unfamiliar persons ever being in the lab.

[REDACTED] did not know for certain where Ames Ba was stored in the [REDACTED] lab, but guessed that it was probably stored in the cold storage area. [REDACTED] believed the location of Ames Ba would be common knowledge only to those who worked in the [REDACTED] section. Anyone who had access to the cold storage freezer would have access to Ames Ba and whatever else was stored in the freezer.

[REDACTED] was unsure whether or not Dr. Bruce Ivins ever distributed Ames Ba. [REDACTED] was not aware of any simulants being stored in the [REDACTED] labs. [REDACTED] never requested to work with the Ames Ba.

[REDACTED] primarily worked with Dr. Bruce Ivins and [REDACTED] inside the [REDACTED] labs. The principle investigators (PIs) who worked in the [REDACTED] labs were Dr. Bruce Ivins and [REDACTED] along with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. However, [REDACTED] never worked with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] was aware of one other principle investigator [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall who [REDACTED] technician, only that the technician was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

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b7cContinuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/19/2007, Page 6

\_\_\_\_\_ socialized with \_\_\_\_\_ and has maintained contact with \_\_\_\_\_ and considers \_\_\_\_\_ a good friend. \_\_\_\_\_ also kept in touch with Dr. Bruce Ivins and \_\_\_\_\_ after leaving USAMRIID, and even received a letter of recommendation from Ivins. However, \_\_\_\_\_ has not maintained contact with either Ivins or \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ recognized the name \_\_\_\_\_ but could not recall why \_\_\_\_\_ knew the name. \_\_\_\_\_ believed that \_\_\_\_\_ might have left USAMRIID shortly after \_\_\_\_\_ arrival in \_\_\_\_\_ did not know a soldier with the last name of \_\_\_\_\_ but did recall \_\_\_\_\_ was a lab technician who left in \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ did not recall which principle investigator that \_\_\_\_\_ worked with. \_\_\_\_\_ did not recall a \_\_\_\_\_ that worked at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ knew a \_\_\_\_\_ who was a civilian who worked in the Bacteriology section in Building \_\_\_\_\_ was a \_\_\_\_\_ who worked with \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that physical security was increased at USAMRIID shortly after the Oklahoma City building. The increased security measures included no parking next to the buildings and additional concrete barriers being added to deter vehicles from getting too close to buildings.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/22/2007


Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

United States Army Medical Research Institute of  
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee [redacted] was

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[Large redacted box]

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[Redacted box]

Investigation on 01/22/2007 at Frederick, Maryland


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File # 279A-WF-222936-302, 4841

Date dictated N/A


by Special Agent [redacted]

Postal Inspector [redacted]



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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/11/2007

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[redacted] date of birth [redacted] home phone [redacted]  
[redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] contacted SA [redacted] to provide additional  
information from [redacted] interview on 12/21/2006. [redacted] has been  
interviewed multiple times regarding [redacted] work with *Bacillus*  
*anthracis* (Ba) [Anthrax] while being employed at the United  
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases  
(USAMRIID). [redacted] provided the following information:

The state park that [redacted] visited on  
September 21 and 22, 2001, was located in [redacted]

The conference that [redacted] attended in which dried Ba  
was discussed was from November 14-16, 2004. [redacted] could not  
locate a paper on the topic because it was purposely not  
documented. [redacted] thought that the person who discussed the  
dried Ba was [redacted] thought that representatives  
at the conference were from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Central Intelligence Agency and Dugway Proving Ground.

[redacted] said that [redacted] thought about yesterday's interview  
regarding a question by Postal Inspector [redacted] in which  
[redacted] asked about different types of Ba stock. [redacted] stated  
that when it comes to a researchers spores, there are  
differences, but not necessarily stock. [redacted] thought that  
BRUCE IVINS made the best spores followed by [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] Back in 2001 [redacted] ability to  
make spores was "hit or miss." [redacted] thought that [redacted]  
made good quality spores, but poor quantity.

Investigation on 12/22/2006 at [redacted] (telephonically)  
File # 279A-WF-222936-302 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] Date dictated 01/11/2007  
by [redacted] *use file*

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/22/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] SSN [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]  
[redacted] by  
Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Federal Bureau of  
Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office and Postal Inspector  
(PI) [redacted] Washington Division. [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] and cellular  
phone number [redacted] was previously interviewed by the  
FBI on approximately two separate occasions regarding [redacted] work with  
*Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) [Anthrax] while being employed at the  
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious  
Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland.  
[redacted] signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement which was placed in an FD-  
340 of the 1A subfile. [redacted] was advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted] was employed in the [redacted] Division at  
USAMRIID since [redacted]  
[redacted] was previously employed at  
USAMRIID as a [redacted]  
[redacted] started  
working in the [redacted] of USAMRIID, in  
September/October of [redacted] work since being employed at  
USAMRIID has been with Ba. However, recently [redacted] has started  
working with [redacted]

[redacted] told [redacted] supervisor [redacted]  
[redacted] that [redacted] was being interviewed by the FBI on [redacted]  
[redacted] is the  
[redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] has a close co-worker named [redacted]  
[redacted] is [redacted] technician at  
USAMRIID. [redacted] thought that [redacted] had been interviewed several  
times by the FBI. [redacted] estimated that in 2002, Bacteriology  
Division had 60-70 employees of which two were secretaries.  
Fifteen of the employees were allowed in the hot suites.

[redacted] regularly works with [redacted]  
[redacted] is friendly with [redacted]  
[redacted]

Investigation on 01/18/2007 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-30 279A-WF-222936-302 4847 Date dictated 01/22/2007

by [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 01/18/2007 , Page 2

[ ] had regular conversations with [ ] and [ ] considers [ ] close to [ ] and participates in activities with [ ] outside of the workplace. [ ] currently works on projects with [ ]

[ ] did not have any interaction with [ ] and never worked with [ ] knows BRUCE IVINS and has interacted with him, but has not collaborated with him on projects.

[ ] stated that [ ] wanted the FBI's investigation of the Anthrax mailings to be over and done with, due to it's lingering presence at USAMRIID. [ ] stated that nobody at USAMRIID found the investigation inconvenient. [ ] said that "we've" been made aware that the Anthrax used in the letters was the Ames Strain. [ ] was [ ] when the FBI "raid" occurred at USAMRIID. [ ] knew that the FBI took water to sample because FBI Agent [ ] would ask about it and then take it.

Regarding if the FBI investigation was bothering anyone at USAMRIID, [ ] thought that the investigation was taking it's toll on IVINS. IVINS' name was in the paper and on the Cable News Network (CNN) because of a cold side incident. When IVINS' name was in the paper and on CNN, it bothered IVINS very much. [ ] did not believe that IVINS could have been the mailer of the Anthrax letters. [ ] explained that [ ] gut feeling was that IVINS was not the mailer. [ ] thought that IVINS was preoccupied with the FBI investigation into the Anthrax mailings, and discussed it often. [ ] thought that IVINS was generally a good person. IVINS was involved with the American Red Cross, his kids and the church. IVINS was someone that could be there for you, if needed.

[ ] explained that [ ] could not stand IVINS constantly talking about the FBI investigation [ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 01/18/2007 , Page 3

[ ]  
[ ] IVINS liked to talk and say things to get a reaction out of people. [ ] would be aggravated by IVINS because of his lack in work ethic.

The only other person [ ] heard could have been the mailer was [ ] stated that it was hearsay, but heard that [ ] could be the mailer. [ ]

[ ] stated that if [ ] had any idea of who was the mailer, [ ] would be knocking on the door to the FBI. [ ] said that [ ] would come to the FBI in a minute.

[ ]  
[ ] was a Bacteriology employee that had been interviewed many times by the FBI. [ ] apparently mailed IVINS a letter that was postmarked in New Jersey as a supposed prank. [ ]

[ ] wanted to take care of the prank before it became an issue. [ ]

[ ] could not recall which year that the prank letter was mailed. [ ]

[ ]  
IVINS was not given authorization to swab areas in USAMRIID for his own contamination study. [ ] stated that IVINS had no malcontent with the swabbings. [ ] explained that Bacteriology currently has a designated list of persons permitted to take swabbings when needed and IVINS was not on the list.

The [ ] department gets along very well and does not have personal conflicts. The only personnel related incident [ ] involved IVINS. [ ] IVINS was taking some type of medication that he was not allowed and as a result was taken out of the hot suites for a 30-60 day period. [ ] thought that the pills were anti-depressants or sleeping pills. The details of IVINS removal would be in his Personal Reliability Program (PRP) files. The PRP program was initiated after the mailings and has only been in effect for the past two years. [ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 01/18/2007 , Page 4

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] IVINS discussed the mental illness of IVINS mother. IVINS thought that Schizophrenia may have been in his family. IVINS never made a comparison of himself with his mothers mental illness.

[ ] has observed IVINS in depressed states over the years. When IVINS' name appears in the newspapers, he becomes depressed. [ ]  
[ ]

[ ]  
[ ] regarded IVINS as a heavy drinker, a change that occurred over the past couple of years. A couple of years ago, IVINS was known to not be a heavy drinker. [ ] has never observed IVINS smell of alcohol or be drunk while at work. If IVINS was to call in sick from work, he would call [ ]

Thursdays are known as "thirsty Thursdays" for those employees that choose to meet and drink after work. In the past the meeting place was on base at the Community Activities Center (CAC) [ ]  
[ ]

[ ] did not recall IVINS ever discussing IVINS' father or possible Ivy League colleges attended by IVINS' father. [ ] thought that IVINS had two brothers. One brother he does not associate with and the other brother he does. IVINS and the brother he associates with go on trips together. [ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 01/18/2007 , Page 5

[ ]

[ ] does not know anyone with ties to New Jersey. IVINS and [ ] made it a point to not travel to New Jersey. [ ] recalled that IVINS thought that the mailer was [ ] because IVINS researched where [ ] lived in New Jersey.

[ ]

[ ]

IVINS is currently much more mainstream about his religious beliefs. IVINS has made comments [ ] about the Di-Vinci Code and Mary Magdalene. [ ]

[ ]

[ ] IVINS made an off color joke about the Israel-Lebanese conflict. IVINS asked "How many Palestinian kids does it take to screw in a light bulb", to which he answered none, since Israel killed them all. Everyone that works with IVINS thinks of him as their crazy uncle. IVINS was not hateful, just inappropriate or off color.

[ ] has never heard of the "camel club." [ ] does not know of anyone with left or right wing politics. [ ] does not know of anyone that is very pro-life [ ] thinks most are liberal. IVINS was known to attend pro-life gatherings. [ ] recalled a strange comment by IVINS in which IVINS wanted to have a hero/villain party. IVINS suggested he dress as an abortion doctor and let other people decide if he was a hero or villain.

[ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 01/18/2007, Page 6

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

has never worked with dried Ba, nor has  heard anyone discuss it or make reference to dried Ba.

[Redacted]

knew that a lyophilizer could be used to dry wet Ba, but did not know how to use one.  thought that the lyophilizer would make what was being dried, very clumpy.  has seen one used before to take cells, autoclave them then once they were dried be utilized as a vaccine.  knew that a lyophilizer was utilized on the cold side by

[Redacted]

Regarding other ways to dry Ba,  thought that placing the wet material under the hood may achieve dried Ba, but it would take a long time. The normal work day  and others in

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ], On 01/18/2007, Page 7

group would be from 8am to 5pm. After hours work along with weekend work is a rarity. [ ]

[ ] The longest after hours time [ ] worked in the hot suites was four to five hours, but explained that was a very rare instance.

[ ] The only person that [ ] has heard discuss leaving USAMRIID was [ ]

The persons who have patents at USAMRIID are [ ]  
IVINS, [ ]

The group of people from the office that go drinking on Thursdays after work at the Glory Days Grill are IVINS, [ ]

[ ] does not think that anyone in [ ] group have hang-ups. [ ] does not associate with [ ]

The computers used in [ ] were leased and now are being purchased by USAMRIID. Approximately every three to four years, the computers are replaced at USAMRIID. They are required to replace the computers every five years. [ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 01/18/2007, Page 8

elaborated on an email that IVINS sent  regarding an FBI agent referred to as "Fuzzy Cuffs."

IVINS gave  the nickname of "Fuzzy Cuffs", due to the perceived connection between

along with  agreed to further assist the FBI in the investigation into the mailing of the Anthrax letters.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/25/2007

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social  
security account number [redacted] home telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed  
at [redacted]

[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing  
agent and postal inspector and purpose of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] in 1991 that a  
variety of samples were missing from the lab including anthrax.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 1/25/2006 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4850

Date dictated

S/A [redacted]

by PI [redacted]

[Redacted]

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SSA

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/25/2006, Page 2

felt that many people benefitted from the 2001 anthrax mailings through business ventures and employment with private companies.

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/25/2006, Page 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are still employed at  
USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated a photo of [REDACTED] opening the Daschle  
letter appears in newspapers from time to time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided that Bruce IVINS, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] worked in Bacteriology [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/25/2006, Page 4

provided the following documents to investigators:

7153. They have been submitted to the case file, enclosed in 1A

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/18/2007

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social  
security account number [redacted] home telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

[redacted] After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing agent and postal inspector and purpose  
of the interview [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 01/18/2007 at [redacted]  
279A-WF-222936-302 - 4851  
File # \_\_\_\_\_ Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_  
by SA [redacted]  
PI [redacted]



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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/18/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] began [REDACTED] employment with USAMRIID in [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED] at USAMRIID from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] indicated that their relationship was

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/18/2007, Page 3

one of co-workers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] volunteered that [REDACTED] could have also mailed the anthrax letters using anthrax obtained from the lab's aerosol challenges. [REDACTED] explained the mechanics of an anthrax challenge. The anthrax is suspended in a fluid placed in the plexiglass container containing the animal. Compressed air creates a mist containing the anthrax inside the animal's container. Upon completion of a challenge, the container is wiped out and the collected anthrax is disposed of.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/18/2007, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that the anthrax, if not obtained by the cleaning of the animal containers, had been stolen. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ The e-mail indicated the anthrax recovered from the anthrax letters was "almost an exact match" to the anthrax used by \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that people at USAMRIID do not voluntarily leave their positions, but rather are forced out.

\_\_\_\_\_ that theft was common at USAMRIID and presented an article from 1990 where a soldier had been stopped by base security. A search of the soldier's vehicle yielded six vials containing an unknown substance.

\_\_\_\_\_ spoke of a further cover up in USAMRIID regarding BRUCE IVINS. IVINS had discovered that there was wide spread anthrax contamination in the research area \_\_\_\_\_ relayed that IVINS had noticed a dust on his desk in his office. IVINS collected the dust on an agar plate and determined that it was anthrax. The discovery came shortly after a visit to USAMRIID by United States Senator \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stressed that the contamination had in effect exposed a third United States Senator to anthrax. IVINS notified USAMRIID management, who in turn began an investigation of IVINS.

\_\_\_\_\_ was provided a copy of USAMRIID's final report on the facility contamination by newspaper USA Today. USA Today

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/18/2007, Page 5

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ felt that the Army had targeted IVINS because his discovery of anthrax in the hallway.

\_\_\_\_\_ provided the following documents and CD-Rs to investigators:

[Redacted]

7133. They have been submitted to the case file, enclosed in 1A

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/05/2007


On 01/27/2007, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] home  
telephone number [redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] contacted SA [redacted] telephonically and  
provided the following information:

On Saturday morning, 01/27/2007, [redacted] saw BRUCE IVINS  
at [redacted] did not speak  
with IVINS at that time. [redacted] stated that [redacted] would have normally  
called IVINS after seeing him; however, [redacted] felt that [redacted] could not  
do so because [redacted]

[redacted] has known IVINS for years.

[redacted] described IVINS as a "very good friend". [redacted]

[redacted] is afraid to contact any colleagues because [redacted]  
thinks [redacted] phone is bugged.



Investigation on 01/27/2007 at (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4854

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by SA [redacted]



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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/16/2007

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, employee, BRUCE IVINS, initially purchased and was the property receipt holder for a small fermentor. (WFO NOTE: the small fermentor has previously been identified as a 5 liter Bio Flow III fermentor.) After some period, [REDACTED] became the property receipt holder for the small fermentor after IVINS transferred control of the same to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS stated he was happy to help out the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); however, based upon his "interrogation" the last time the FBI spoke with him, IVINS reiterated, he was only going to speak to the FBI with his attorney present. IVINS did not meet with the FBI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS explained "the FBI cancelled the meeting."

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b7CInvestigation on 02/16/2007 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)File # [REDACTED] 279A-WF-222936-302-4803 Date dictated N/Aby Special Agent [REDACTED]b6  
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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/21/2007

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

~~United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee, BRUCE IVINS~~ [redacted] discussing a recent USAMRIID email which stated in part that USAMRIID employees were not to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided a subpoena to the USAMRIID employee. IVINS [redacted] noted sarcastically that now the Army was looking out for its employees. IVINS [redacted] also concluded that someone higher up in the Army did not want USAMRIID employees talking to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

co-worker suggested, "Bruce, just put down 'I confess.'" IVINS only laughed at the co-worker suggestion.

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IVINS was overheard commenting [redacted] that different media components would alter the observed colony color of *Bacillus anthracis*. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 02/20/2007 at Frederick, Maryland4864- File # 279A-WF-222936-302, [redacted]Date dictated N/Ab6  
b7C  
b7DPostal Inspector [redacted]  
by Special Agent [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302, [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Individual, On 02/21/2007, Page 2b6  
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[REDACTED] has said nothing to date pertaining to [REDACTED] interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Individual was certain IVINS and [REDACTED] were testing whether or not formalin fix *Bacillus anthracis* cells were biologically inactive following fixation. These tests were predicated upon the discovery that [REDACTED] methodology for producing formalin fixed *Bacillus anthracis* cells did not render the cells biologically inactive. Individual reiterated it was [REDACTED] whose formalin fixed *Bacillus anthracis* cells were passed from the hot suite; however, later the same showed growth when plated. Individual noted [REDACTED] appears to be held to a different standard at USAMRIID, whereas IVINS and [REDACTED] have specific, stringent standard operating procedures, it appears [REDACTED] does not.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 03/06/2007

On March 06, 2007, [REDACTED] SSAN [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] home telephone number [REDACTED], cellular telephone number [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] work telephone number [REDACTED] was  
interviewed at the Postal Inspection Service Washington D.C.  
Headquarters. After being advised of the purpose of the  
interview and the identity of the interviewing agents, [REDACTED]  
provided the following information:

[REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had been told by [REDACTED] at  
the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases  
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, that "someone" had been  
"piggybacking" into the labs at USAMRIID. By piggybacking,  
[REDACTED] said this meant allowing someone into the labs without  
that individual having their own access device. [REDACTED] said the  
"someone" was [REDACTED], but did not know who [REDACTED] has been  
letting into the labs. The date of these entries was unknown.

(1,2,3,4,5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

These documents will be described throughout this record, and  
are enclosed in a 1A along with the original interview notes.

[REDACTED] provided an email from [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] dated [REDACTED] In the email, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 03/06/07 at Washington D.C.File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4866 Date dictated 03/06/07by PI [REDACTED]  
PI [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/06/07, Page 4

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] then produced several articles describing various incidents of contamination and deaths surrounding USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that these articles show the overall corruption of USAMRIID. One article described an Army scientist who tested positive for exposure to anthrax. [REDACTED] said that this scientist was a [REDACTED] of BRUCE IVINS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/06/07, Page 5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] referenced several memos or emails from the  
USAMRIID command telling personnel not to talk to the FBI.

[REDACTED] named [REDACTED] as the USAMRIID spokesman.

[REDACTED] said the current USAMRIID "drama" is regarding  
funding. The committee that divided up funding amongst sections  
has become corrupted and gives money out to "friends" of  
committee members. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/06/07, Page 6

[REDACTED]

Referencing personnel at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] stated that  
"everyone is worried about their job." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription . 03/20/2007

[redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]  
[redacted] on the evening of March 19, 2007.  
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Postal  
Inspector and Special Agent (SA), and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: also present during the interview was [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] was at the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort  
Detrick, Maryland, for four (4) or five (5) days in 2000.  
[redacted] further advised [redacted] never had access to the  
biocontainment suites at USAMRIID. [redacted] advised [redacted] has not  
conducted any biocontainment suite work in the past [redacted]  
years.

[redacted] interacted most with [redacted] at  
USAMRIID. [redacted] (4)

Investigation on 03/19/2007 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4867

Date dictated N/A

Postal Inspector [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/19/2007, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was aware that USAMRIID employee, Dr. BRUCE IVINS, attempted to ship the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* to [REDACTED] and that the request was ultimately denied [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/19/2007, Page 3

acknowledged that [REDACTED] anthrax-vaccine was developed circa December 2001.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has never possessed the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 03/19/2007, Page 4

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Through observation and interview  is further described as:

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 03/15/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

[redacted] by Special Agent (SA)

[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

Washington Field Office and Postal Inspector (PI) [redacted]

[redacted], Washington Division. [redacted]

[redacted] was previously interviewed by the FBI on several occasions regarding [redacted] work with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) [Anthrax] while being employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement which was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile. [redacted] was shown photographs of the victims of this crime and read short biographies of each one. In addition [redacted] was read open news media stories of some of the victims. A copy of all that was shown and read to [redacted] was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile. [redacted] was also shown pictures of the envelopes used to mail the anthrax, [redacted] access charts for [redacted] and co-workers, and a copy of a Grand Jury subpoena dated [redacted], all of which was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile. [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/14/2007 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-131 279A-WF-222936-302 <sup>4870</sup> Date dictated 03/15/2007

SA [redacted]  
by PI [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of ☐

, On 03/14/2007, Page 2

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

☐ did not know anyone at USAMRIID that discussed politics or had extreme left or right wing political views. ☐ recalled that unknown persons at USAMRIID wrote letters to Frederick News Post, but they were not regarding political ravings ☐ has never seen any pre-stamped postal envelopes at USAMRIID. ☐ did not know who could have been the mailer of the Anthrax laced letters in 2001.

During the 2001 Anthrax conference, ☐ recalled a ☐ named ☐ who was upset during the conference.

[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 03/14/2007 , Page 3

[ ] recalled that IVINS made jokes about sororities and fraternities in general. He would normally ask someone if they were part of either one.

[ ] guessed that the anthrax used in the anthrax laced letters were from USAMRIID due to the FBI taking samples of spores including the sampling of IVINS' flask.

[ ] advised that the rule of thumb at USAMRIID was not to be in the hot suites by yourself for safety reasons. On September 11, 2001, building [ ] was in lock down. [ ] provided that because there were 6-8 labs in the hot suites in [ ] area, [ ] did not know all of the projects being conducted by other researchers. [ ] was not aware of any project that [ ] in the hot suites were working on that would have required late night hours or work over the weekends. If a researcher was performing a test where an animal needed to be checked, then someone would go observe the animals status every 4-8 hours, including over the weekend. [ ] did not recall anything in the hot suites looking "out of place" during September/October 2001. [ ]

When questioned about knowing anyone that would be at USAMRIID hot suites after hours [ ] replied that IVINS was known to take daily showers at USAMRIID in order to save money.

279A-WF-222936- [ ] 279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 03/14/2007 , Page 4

The only explanation that [ ] could provide for extended late night or weekend work in the hot suites was having to move samples from a broken freezer. Documentation by the building maintenance/engineering persons would show if that happened during September/October 2001. At the time of the Anthrax attacks, [ ]

[ ] did not recall IVINS helping close down one of the suites. If IVINS had helped, it would not have occurred over the weekend.

After reviewing the [ ] hot suite access charts, [ ] was unable to explain extended late night and weekend hours for [ ] IVINS. [ ] explained that when [ ] went into the hot suites after hours or weekends [ ] it took [ ] longer to drive to and from work, get dressed to enter the hot suites and shower up after entering the hot suites, then to perform the actual task within the hot suites.

[ ] provided that IVINS and [ ] typically work together

[ ] They should be able to explain any possible late night and weekend projects. In addition, if they kept good notes, there should be an entry in their notebooks. Some researchers are better than other at documenting. [ ] usually writes some notes regarding [ ] experiments. At minimum the notebook should include the date and time of what was being tested/observed.

If the person who committed the crime grew the Ba during regular work hours and dried it, [ ] thought that it would be difficult, because using the lyophilizer would be uncommon and easily noticed. In addition, the lyophilizer was not located in the hot suite area, and would be very difficult to move. [ ] did not know of any other methods of drying Ba. If the Ba could be dried by just letting it dry under a hood, [ ] thought it should be noticed by other researches, due to it's appearance as being unsafe. [ ] thought it may be possible to dry the Ba in petri dishes rather than a flask, so

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 03/14/2007 , Page 5

that it was a smaller concentration to dry. [ ] thought that autoclaving whatever was used to grow the spores could hide the evidence. There were two autoclaves in [ ] suites. [ ] advised that when [ ] used the autoclaves, [ ] would set them for 30 minutes. Sometimes it may take up to an hour. The autoclave does not burn things, it heats them up. Glass can be reused after autoclaving, but some of the plastics will melt and should not be reused. [ ] thought that because it would take a long time to dry 'Ba by letting it dry under a hood, that someone would notice and report it as a safety violation. It was not "out of bounds" for a researcher to ask questions to another researcher if they felt something was not right.

[ ] provided that IVINS liked to share his theory that [ ] could be the mailer because [ ] was considered the "bully on the block." [ ]

[ ]

[ ] recalled hearing about a letter that [ ] mailed to IVINS from New Jersey. [ ] thought the time period of the letter was approximately 2005 or 2006. [ ] IVINS scanned the letter and emailed it to [ ] [ ] assumed that [ ] sent the letter to IVINS as a joke. [ ] did not think that IVINS was mad at [ ] about mailing the letter. [ ]

[ ]

After being shown a Grand Jury Subpoena dated 02/15/2002, that was used to [ ] [ ] acknowledged that [ ] had seen it before. [ ]

[ ]

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279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-302

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/14/2007, Page 6

[redacted]  
[redacted] stated that [redacted] was familiar with the Subpoena up to and including page 3. [redacted] did not receive any other Grand Jury subpoenas or additional requests for [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] advised that USAMRIID routinely conducted research projects with pharmaceutical companies. Projects with pharmaceutical companies occur more frequently now than during 2001. The funding available for research projects is currently much smaller than back in 2001.

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Regarding the samples [redacted] to FBI SA [redacted] advised that SA [redacted] just took the whole samples in order to screen them for contaminants.

[redacted]  
[redacted] advised [redacted] would contact agents at a later date regarding if [redacted] would take a polygraph examination.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/12/2007

On [redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security number [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at the United States Army Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at 1425 Porter  
Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland by Postal Inspector (PI) [redacted]  
[redacted] of the US Postal Inspection Service and Special Agent (SA)  
[redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and  
the purpose of the interview. [redacted] signed a Non Disclosure  
agreement, which was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile.  
[redacted] has been previously interviewed by the FBI multiple times  
regarding the Anthrax Attacks during September and October of 2001.  
[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is a [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted]  
stated that [redacted] current residence is [redacted]  
[redacted] provided a home phone of [redacted], and the  
cell phone number of [redacted]  
[redacted] also  
provided [redacted] personal email address as [redacted] and [redacted]  
work email as [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] described  
USAMRIID's perception of the investigation as inconvenient because  
there was extra paperwork involved. As for [redacted] perception of the  
investigation, [redacted] wondered why there was no new info provided.

[redacted]

Investigation on 1/30/2007 at USAMRIID, Ft. Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936 - 302 sub 4871

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by PI [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/30/2007, Page 2

When asked about RMR-1029, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] had never heard of it. [REDACTED] only knew of spores by name strain. There was one strain that [REDACTED] did remember the number as [REDACTED] because the number sticks out in the inventory. [REDACTED] knows [REDACTED] has a name but [REDACTED] doesn't remember it. [REDACTED] was aware of Ames strain and considered it common. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone having or being in charge of a special batch of Ames. Nor has [REDACTED] heard of anyone in particular bragging about how good their particular spores were. [REDACTED] noted that for tests, there is a paper trail concerning requests and the number of animals needed. There has been no bragging by any personnel on the quality of spores.

Most work is done during business hours according to [REDACTED]. There is an after hours rotation consisting of [REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED] and half of the [REDACTED] roster, performing the same work they were during the time of the attacks. Personnel are in the suites for minutes or hours. Current testing involves a 6 hour injection [REDACTED]. The shifts being 6 am to 12 pm, then 6 pm to 12 midnight. Back in 2001, they were conducting therapeutic studies or time of death studies.

Concerning the growth of spores in the 2000 and 2001 time period, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] were growing spores in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] were also growing spores back then. [REDACTED] also grew some spores but [REDACTED] was unsure of the exact time frame. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] would not log information regarding spore growths. [REDACTED] wasn't informed to do so nor was [REDACTED] required.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The property receipt was actually a hand receipt inventory that confirmed that the lyophilizer was there and where it was supposed to be. The lyophilizer is accountable property to BRUCE IVINS. The lyophilizer has been in the hallway ever since [REDACTED] has been at USAMRIID and is now in the [REDACTED] hallway. It is not easily moved because of its size and weight.

When asked how someone would grow spores without anyone else knowing, [REDACTED] replied that [REDACTED] wasn't sure due to the fact that there are warning signs when the centrifuge is in use, nothing is secretive in the suites, and since the area is small, there are always people in the area. [REDACTED] considered the suites overcrowded.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/2007, Page 3

Powdered donuts tend to evoke jokes about "powders" in the department. On one occasion, [REDACTED] was using the lyophilizer, personnel passing by would joke by asking of that was "good grade" or make comments such as "We don't make dry, we make wet."

[REDACTED] stated there was no one point of contact for "piddly" stuff or personnel rumors, though anyone could be the "grapevine" because it was a tight group.

[REDACTED] described the group of co-workers who go drinking alcohol together on Thursdays after work. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The regulars were [REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED] The topics discussed are usually work, sports and home do it yourself topics. The Amerithrax investigation has come up. The polygraph, the draining of the pond, which was a common joke regarding the investigation, and statements such as "Why are they calling me, I don't know anything" have been mentioned. There is nobody worried more about the investigation than others according to [REDACTED]

When asked who would [REDACTED] look at concerning the attack, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] wouldn't know where to look. [REDACTED] stated that maybe the spores were sent to [REDACTED] or to another facility. "I trust every last one of them" said [REDACTED] "If it went out to [REDACTED] I still wouldn't know, they are a pretty good group of people." According to [REDACTED] spores have been made for people in [REDACTED] or even [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS kept up with the transfers and paperwork. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] sign then they would take off with the spores. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Copies of the receipts go to IVINS, [REDACTED], and the receiver of the spores. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] office may also get a copy.

There have been no confrontations between coworkers according to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/2007, Page 4

[REDACTED]

Nobody speaks about New Jersey according to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] went to a conference in New Jersey. [REDACTED] was unsure of  
the time frame. [REDACTED] sent a post card to BRUCE IVINS from New  
Jersey which made IVINS nervous and upset. "You're going to get me  
in trouble" said IVINS to [REDACTED] thought it was done as a  
joke and did not read the post card.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described IVINS as a good guy. IVINS could be  
annoying when trying to be funny. He sends via email pictures of  
kittens and funny pictures. He loves cats but can't have cats. He  
got a rabbit for his kids. [REDACTED] is allergic to

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/30/2007 , Page 5

[REDACTED] IVINS is falling apart physically. IVINS has muscle deterioration in his calf, has torn his Achilles tendon, and is having disc problems in his back. IVINS jokes that "You'll be doing the perp walk if you talk to the FBI."

[REDACTED] maintains that IVINS is a really good guy. As for any changes in IVINS behavior, IVINS used to not drink at all. Now IVINS likes to drink Cold Duck wine. [REDACTED] believes that IVINS limits his drinks to two, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As for quirks, [REDACTED] observed IVINS mark the skin on his leg in order to know exactly where to rub on his leg to help relieve pain. The elastic is gone from IVINS' socks. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that IVINS does worry about the FBI investigation. IVINS is nervous about it, but he worries about a lot of things. IVINS is precautious in terms of safety. IVINS loves women with long hair. Concerning sororities and fraternities, [REDACTED] was in a sorority and [REDACTED] was in a fraternity. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that he doesn't really have anything negative to say about IVINS. IVINS talks about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the days IVINS would go drink alcohol with [REDACTED] co-workers at the Community Activities Center (CAC), IVINS would leave the group to go eat dinner with his wife [REDACTED] and then return to the CAC. IVINS time varies from being early to staying until 9 or 10 pm. IVINS is Catholic and has anti-abortion views. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS has also stated that LYNDON B. JOHNSON was the worst US President ever. According to [REDACTED] IVINS doesn't preach but you know where he stands. IVINS sings in the choir and plays organ. He also plays in a band on St. Patrick's Day. IVINS is very good with poems. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as being very religious. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know if IVINS' parents were educated. [REDACTED] had once talked about [REDACTED] dad while sipping coffee. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] dad as having an annoying way of sipping coffee. [REDACTED] said that IVINS sips coffee the same way as [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 1/30/2007, Page 6

dad. \_\_\_\_\_ did know that IVINS attended the University of Cincinnati and worked at one time for the Uniform Health Services.

\_\_\_\_\_ described \_\_\_\_\_ as an alright guy. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ said \_\_\_\_\_ only knows of \_\_\_\_\_ worked for BRUCE IVINS. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know \_\_\_\_\_ though \_\_\_\_\_ described \_\_\_\_\_ as aggressive. \_\_\_\_\_ only knew of incidents \_\_\_\_\_ described as hearsay. The first incident being \_\_\_\_\_ slapping BRUCE IVINS one time. The second incident occurring when \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ A third incident occurred when IVINS went around \_\_\_\_\_ concerning procedures at work. The result was \_\_\_\_\_ putting IVINS in a headlock. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Later in the interview, \_\_\_\_\_ recounted that BRUCE IVINS made comments that \_\_\_\_\_ lived in New Jersey \_\_\_\_\_ said "so far from the mailbox or the person that died" indicating that \_\_\_\_\_ lived close to the mailbox used in the Anthrax mailings. IVINS brought in an American Automobile Association (AAA) map concerning this statement which was made three to four years ago. \_\_\_\_\_ thought that IVINS was a AAA member.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/2007, Page 7

[REDACTED] was questioned about theories or how someone would commit this crime at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] said everybody knows what everybody is doing. "I honestly don't know how it would be done" said [REDACTED] "That's a several day process, the autoclave is always open to clean your trays." After thinking about the question, [REDACTED] said someone could just do it during the daytime. If you are here after hours, everyone knows what you are doing. After hours work are usually group procedures. [REDACTED] said there is a sign-in roster for procedures or tests. When asked what was a reasonable amount of time for being in the "hot" suites after hours, [REDACTED] replied half an hour to an hour just to check on an animal or procedure.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] use the lyophilizer. IVINS knows how to use the lyophilizer, but doesn't use it. If you ask IVINS how to use the lyophilizer, he'll tell you. IVINS is responsible for the lyophilizer since it is accountable property to him.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] IVINS would come in to the "hot" suites at USAMRIID and take showers because his kids used all the hot water, then IVINS would stay and do paperwork. That was normal, IVINS still showers late at night at USAMRIID according to [REDACTED] As for anyone else staying late, [REDACTED] mentioned [REDACTED] staying for [REDACTED] which was not out of the ordinary. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also stayed late. [REDACTED] describes them as largely dedicated to their work, and talking science all of the time. In [REDACTED] there were space issues. In [REDACTED] suites were going down. Everyone in [REDACTED] shifted over with people who were in [REDACTED] was in the lab. [REDACTED] had weird hours and was strange according to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] liked pushing IVINS buttons concerning abortion. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/2007, Page 8

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is described as being intelligent, and a hard worker. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is described as a [REDACTED] never lie to you, [REDACTED] give you the answer." [REDACTED] is also described as a person who will be more than happy to give you help. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS used to play golf [REDACTED] but because of his various injuries he no longer plays. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/2007, Page 9

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked to recall when the letters from the 2001 Anthrax mailing came into the facility. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] didn't see how anybody got the dry Ba that clear. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS, [REDACTED] remarked that the dry Ba was "too clear" for here (USAMRIID). There was "scientific excitement" when the letters were brought in. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know who carried the letters into the [REDACTED] suite. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knew that IVINS swabbed areas in USAMRIID where he was not supposed to. Regarding the swabbing incident, [REDACTED] said that it is BRUCE IVINS' paranoia that he get in trouble again. At the time of the swabbing, management wasn't happy. Management being [REDACTED]. As for the swabbing, IVINS didn't want to be yelled at again. IVINS feels like the situation made him look bad. [REDACTED] opined that [REDACTED] was covering for the screwed up process that occurred when the letters came in, by blaming [REDACTED]. Everybody was excited from a scientific point of view at the time. [REDACTED] added that [REDACTED] never seen IVINS confrontational.

[REDACTED]

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b7cContinuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 1/30/2007, Page 10

\_\_\_\_\_ was asked about who was the best person at growing spores, \_\_\_\_\_ identified \_\_\_\_\_ IVINS, and \_\_\_\_\_ as the most experienced persons, \_\_\_\_\_

As for \_\_\_\_\_ having any relation to New Jersey, \_\_\_\_\_ replied that \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ had not heard anyone mention or note any day trips to New Jersey. \_\_\_\_\_ had not heard anyone mention the sorority KAPPA KAPPA GAMMA (KKG). \_\_\_\_\_ had not heard anyone have a non-compliance stance toward the investigation.

When asked if \_\_\_\_\_ knows of Ba by any other name, \_\_\_\_\_ replied Ames and Sterne. IVINS, \_\_\_\_\_ worked on the strain. As for another name for Ames, \_\_\_\_\_ replied "just Ames."

\_\_\_\_\_ said there is a formalized method for sending Ba out of the facility it. IVINS usually pulls the Ba out of a large flask prior to preparing it to be sent. IVINS has gotten Ba from Dugway, according to \_\_\_\_\_ IVINS gets the amount, puts its in sterile water, and sends it out. IVINS is in charge of giving it out, as well as \_\_\_\_\_. The amounts are usually 1 ml to 10 ml for spraying. BATTELLE and DUGWAY have the large amounts of Ba. When asked how its purified, \_\_\_\_\_ replied that it is put through a series of gradients to pull out trash and clean up the spores. It is then stored in phenol, mixed with hypaque. \_\_\_\_\_ added that IVINS gets his numbers right. IVINS is always consistent with his numbers. \_\_\_\_\_ mixed BATTELLE spores with DUGWAY spores back in 2001/2002. \_\_\_\_\_ needed the spores and this practice was not uncommon.

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/30/2007, Page 11

At the conclusion of the interview,  provided a copy of the  Division Phone List which was placed in an FD-340 of the 1A subfile.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 04/30/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth (DOB) [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] on  
the evening of April 27, 2007. After being advised of the identity  
of the interviewing Special Agents (SAs) and the nature of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S-6)

Investigation on 04/27/2007 at [redacted]  
File # SA 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4876 Date dictated N/A  
by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/27/2007 , Page 3

Soon after [REDACTED] arrival at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] began working with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* in the [REDACTED] hot suite. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was certain [REDACTED] received the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* from USAMRIID employee BRUCE IVINS. [REDACTED] recalled IVINS's gave [REDACTED] the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* in an eppendorf tube. At a later point in the interview, [REDACTED] opined it was possible IVINS gave [REDACTED] the eppendorf tube and [REDACTED] then gave it to [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was certain that in either case IVINS provided [REDACTED] the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* used in [REDACTED] research. [REDACTED] characterized [REDACTED] research at USAMRIID as determining [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not purify the spores IVINS had provided to [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] did not have a need to do so. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] could not recall if the spores IVINS had provided [REDACTED] were purified in any manner or not. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/27/2007, Page 4

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED]  
took meticulous notes which are maintained at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]  
clarified [REDACTED] maintained [REDACTED] own laboratory notebook while at  
USAMRIID which [REDACTED] turned into the USAMRIID library prior to [REDACTED]  
departure in [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] advised upon leaving USAMRIID in [REDACTED] did not  
leave with any biological specimens or samples. [REDACTED]  
reiterated, [REDACTED] did not take the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*  
from USAMRIID.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] had photocopied [REDACTED] USAMRIID laboratory notebook and  
took the photocopies with [REDACTED] advised, if necessary, [REDACTED]  
would make available for review the same for the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation. In addition to photocopying [REDACTED] USAMRIID laboratory  
notebook [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] photocopied various protocols, as  
well as the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] noted most of [REDACTED] photocopies were made  
on the photocopier machine located near the rear entrance to  
USAMRIID building [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] had used the photocopier in the  
USAMRIID library on occasion too.

[REDACTED] advised "I don't know," when queried as to  
why someone would indicate to the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
that [REDACTED] had tried to obtain the Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis*  
from USAMRIID prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001  
and this attempt appeared nefarious in nature. [REDACTED] advised  
the [REDACTED] did not possess the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*.  
[REDACTED] was specifically queried as what strains of *Bacillus*  
*anthracis* were present at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] had previously identified to the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
to which [REDACTED] responded, "I have no idea."

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 04/27/2007, Page 5

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had no previous, nor any current, contacts in New Jersey. [REDACTED] acknowledged that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had no connections to New Jersey. After being specifically queried to the same, [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] had no knowledge pertaining to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was not involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, nor did [REDACTED] have any information, or knowledge thereof, that would be pertinent to the investigation of the same. [REDACTED] re-iterated it was [REDACTED] duty to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to the investigation surrounding the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. [REDACTED] indicated [REDACTED] would be agreeable to any pertinent follow-up questions and instructed writer to contact [REDACTED] via [REDACTED] email address should the need arise. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Through observation and interview [REDACTED] is further described as:

[REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 04/12/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] home address  
[redacted] home phone number  
[redacted] was telephonically interviewed, regarding  
additional questions following a previous interview on 03/16/2007.  
[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the  
purpose of the interview. [redacted] provided the following  
information:

[redacted] place of employment as a [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] IVINS is a researcher at the United  
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases  
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, who worked with [redacted]  
[redacted]

During the weekend of October 6-7, 2001, [redacted] was with  
[redacted] the entire time. As with most federal holidays, [redacted]  
[redacted]

Investigation on 04/12/2007 at Falls Church, VA (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 279A-WF-222936-302 <sup>4878</sup> Date dictated 04/12/2007

by [redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7cALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 03/28/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] home phone number [redacted]  
[redacted] work phone number [redacted] was interviewed  
at the FBI/Postal Inspection Service office located at 4640  
Wedgewood Blvd., Suites 104/105, Frederick, MD, 21703. [redacted]  
signed a Non-Disclosure Agreement which was placed in an FD-340 of  
the 1A subfile. [redacted] was advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted] had not been previously interviewed by the FBI.  
[redacted] advised that [redacted] works at the  
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious  
Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] knew that [redacted]  
worked with bacteria and worked in what was called [redacted]  
laboratories. [redacted] also worked on [redacted]  
knew that [redacted] worked with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] provided that [redacted] did not have  
problems with any particular person at USAMRIID.

[redacted] hobbies include [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/26/2007 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 279A-WF-222936-302 <sup>4879</sup> Date dictated 03/28/2007by SA [redacted]  
PI [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 03/26/2007 , Page 2

[ ]

[ ] work frequently on the weekends at  
USAMRIID. [ ]

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] was not aware of anyone with connections to New Jersey. [ ] assumed that during [ ] someone would have discussed the Anthrax investigation. The FBI is like a 4 letter word around USAMRIID employees. [ ] stays out of political conversations. [ ] did not know what politics were going on during the Anthrax mailings in 2001. Since 2001, IVINS discussed politics in general. He always had a line of conversation like "who is going to be the next candidate."

[ ]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 03/26/2007 , Page 3

[ ]

In November 2001, [ ] remembered [ ] telling [ ] that [ ] saw the Anthrax laced letters and stating "I don't know who did this." [ ] also recalled that [ ] said that the Anthrax was dry and that it did not come from USAMRIID because they only work with wet Anthrax. [ ] told [ ] that [ ] did not know how the person would put the Anthrax laced letters together. [ ] stated that during [ ] conversations with [ ] over the Anthrax laced letters, [ ] could recognize the fear in [ ] voice.

[ ] remembered [ ] say after [ ] interviews with the FBI that [ ] did not know who could have done this. [ ] thought that [ ] was uncomfortable during [ ] interview in [ ]

[ ] During [ ] second FBI interview in [ ] was comfortable but did not understand why the FBI kept coming back to talk with [ ] provided that [ ] was not a rumor person and usually remained quiet regarding them. However, [ ] would not stick [ ] neck out for someone at the lab regarding the Anthrax investigation. [ ] was 100% confident that [ ] could not have been the person who did the Anthrax attacks. [ ] added that [ ] was not a harmful person. [ ] felt that if [ ] had any idea of who might have done the Anthrax attacks [ ] would have told [ ]

[ ]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/13/2007

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX-2/NVRA

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (Pending)

279A-WF-222936-302 (Pending)-4881

Title: [REDACTED]

AMERITHRAX;  
MAJOR CASE 184

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 01-08-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Synopsis: To document Confidential Human Source (CHS) reporting.

Details: On the morning of 06/13/2007, CHS, who is in a position to testify, telephonically contacted, as pre-arranged, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] AMERITHRAX Squad 2 (AMX-2). CHS provided the following information pertaining to the following United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, employees:

First Name Unknown (FNU) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also is a [REDACTED] Division employee employed by [REDACTED] has been employed at USAMRIID for approximately [REDACTED] years, and is a [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]. There is no employee FNU [REDACTED] employed in the Bacteriology Division; however, it is possible that a summer hire (typically a high school or college student) maybe working for one of the Principal Investigators within the [REDACTED] Division.

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED] that BRUCE IVINS took a distinct liking too while [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID (WFO NOTE: previously referenced, in part, in 279A-WF-222936-302, Serial 4804).

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are [REDACTED] Division employees [REDACTED] are indeed [REDACTED]

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b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: [REDACTED] 06/13/2007

b7D

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] Division employee who works for [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] who started [REDACTED] employment at USAMRIID approximately [REDACTED] years ago. [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] who worked for [REDACTED]; however, about [REDACTED] years ago [REDACTED] switched from [REDACTED] laboratory to [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] currently is [REDACTED] There is no Room [REDACTED] within the [REDACTED] Division in USAMRIID Building [REDACTED] It is likely Room [REDACTED] is Suite [REDACTED] is located next to [REDACTED] hot suite; [REDACTED] work mostly in [REDACTED] too is a [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] although [REDACTED] has access to the [REDACTED] hot suite. To date, [REDACTED] does not have access to the [REDACTED] hot suite. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] Division employee who is also employed by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] began work at USAMRIID circa [REDACTED] and was specifically hired by [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] project [REDACTED] also employed by [REDACTED] began [REDACTED] work at USAMRIID around the same time frame as [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 06/01/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] was interviewed at the FBI/Postal Inspection Service office located at 4640 Wedgewood Blvd., Suites 104/105, Frederick, MD, 21703, by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office and Postal Inspector (PI) [redacted] Washington Division. [redacted] was represented by [redacted] telephone number [redacted] and cellular phone number [redacted] was previously interviewed by the FBI on several occasions regarding [redacted] work with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) [Anthrax] while being employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] was interviewed following a voluntary Polygraph Examination administered by SA [redacted] Washington Field Office. [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 05/22/2007 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 279A-WF-222936-3024883  
Date dictated06/01/2007by SA [redacted]  
PI [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 279A-WF-222936-302

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Continuation of FD-302 of [ ] , On 05/22/2007 , Page 2

[ ] never handled the flask that contained the large stock of Anthrax belonging to IVINS. and advised that [ ] fingerprints should not be on the flask. [ ] did not feel any shared responsibility for the mailings if IVINS or any other USAMRIID employee were somehow the mailer. [ ] indicated that if [ ] were the mailer that [ ] would also be shocked and feel that [ ] could have somehow helped [ ] with problems [ ] may have had. [ ] explained that [ ] reactions to [ ] being the mailer compared to IVINS being the mailer were different because they were two different people. [ ] did not have any idea who the mailer of the Anthrax letters could be.

[ ] advised [ ]  
[ ] did not break any of USAMRIID  
policy, procedures or rules with the handling of Anthrax [ ]

[ ]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 07/16/2007

[redacted] Date of Birth [redacted] Social  
Security Number [redacted]  
[redacted] Home address [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence. [redacted] was  
advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the  
purpose of the interview. A one hour break occurred during the  
interview [redacted] At  
[redacted]

[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] was born in [redacted] but has lived in [redacted]

Investigation on 05/08/2007 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936 - 201 - 4892 Date dictated 07/16/2007by SA [redacted]  
PI [redacted]

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/08/2007, Page 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described [REDACTED] BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS (BRUCE) as very intelligent but not self disciplined. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BRUCE was born in 1946 and was a good child. [REDACTED] knew BRUCE to be a big NASCAR fan. BRUCE graduated from the University of Cincinnati with a degree in Micro Biology. [REDACTED] stated that BRUCE wanted everyone to worship the ground he walked on due to him receiving his PhD. BRUCE was from the Presbyterian faith, but was changed to a devout Catholic when he got married to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 05/08/2007, Page 4

[Redacted]

[Redacted] did not know BRUCE's political views  
because [Redacted] last  
contact with BRUCE was [Redacted] years ago.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/08/2007, Page 5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not think that BRUCE [REDACTED] ever visited  
Princeton University.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
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